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The capacity to build alliances with other firms and to stymie the competition from rival groups is a key
aspect of business activity. However, the competition across different groups is not limited to the marketplace. It
often extends to the political arena. Business activity is the target of many contemporary regulatory policy efforts.
The reverse is also true: firms frequently intervene and deploy significant resources in the attempt to influence the
design and implementation of these policies. Similarly to the marketplace, the field of politics and policy is a field of
interaction that structures competition, and the capacity of business groups to build coalitions is key to their success
in influencing regulatory policies.
Business rarely speaks with one completely unified voice, and there are very real constraints on getting the
business community to ‘act up’ through an advocacy coalition. This is especially challenging when government
policies are not just about the general business environment – things like taxes, infrastructure, and inflation – but
about very specific regulatory interventions, such as safety standards for drug companies, pipeline spill assessment
guidelines, or bank leverage ratios. For instance, why would an agribusiness mobilise to support the pharmaceutical
industry when new costly pharmaceutical regulations are being introduced? Or why would an oil company support
the interests of a car manufacturer when auto safety rules are being tightened? In our study we investigated when
corporate groups reach across the sectoral divide and stand up for the fate of firms in other sectors, in what we call
cross-sectoral “business unity”.
The concept of ‘business unity’ can be broken down in two main component parts: the extent to which corporate
groups from sectors that are not directly targeted by a given regulatory policy mobilise, and the extent to which
those preferences align or diverge from those of the regulated industry (see Figure 1, based on Pagliari & Young,
2014). When a sector targeted for regulation has many business groups from other sectors (“outsiders”) mobilising,
with aligned preferences, we consider this a level of ‘strong unity.’ Conversely, when a regulated sector has many
outsiders mobilising but these outsiders express divergent preferences to the regulated industry, we consider this a
situation of ‘business conflict’.
Figure 1 – Business Unity Matrix
To analyze which sectors are the beneficiaries of the solidarity from other segments of the business community, we
compiled a large dataset comprising comment letters sent by different firms and business organizations in response
to formal consultations launched by regulatory agencies regarding specific regulatory proposals. These responses
provide us with a relatively systematic ‘trace’ of what actors tend to mobilise in response to different regulatory
policies as well as what their specific position are.
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In total we collected 19,597 comment letters in response to 630 different policy consultations in Australia, Canada,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as regulatory consultations held by various
European Union authorities. We selected regulatory proposals directed towards the five important sectors of the
economy: energy, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, telecommunications, and finance.
We coded the sectoral identity of the business groups responding to these consultations as well as their preferences
on a simple but standardised basis in order to generate two key dimensions of interest: the extent to which
‘outsiders’ mobilise over a given regulatory area, and the degree to which their preferences of these outsiders
diverge from the regulated industry. Figure 2 plots the results of this analysis.
Figure 2: Mean Levels of Preference Divergence and Outsider Mobilisation Across Regulated Sectors
Our results suggest that while the amount of support that business groups receive from other sectors differs
significantly across sectors, one sector stand-outs: the financial industry. In particular, our findings reveal that when
the financial sector is being regulated, the broader business community outside the financial sector is both more
likely to mobilise and to express preferences that are highly concordant with the preferences of the financial sector
itself. To use a stylised example, when bankers are faced with a new regulation, manufacturers, commodity firms,
and peak business associations come to their aid, writing letters, meeting with policymakers, and making threats
more frequently than when other sectors are being targeted for regulation.
While the notion that the financial sector occupies a unique position within the broader business community has
been embedded within political economy literature for nearly a century, our study illustrates a mechanism through
which this economic importance translates into an important form of political influence. The support that the financial
industry receives from the rest of the business community is part of the solution to the puzzle of why the financial
industry is often capable to ‘punch above its weight’ in the political arena.
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Notes:
This article is based on the authors’ paper Capital united? Business unity in regulatory politics and the special
place of finance in the Regulation & Governance journal (2015).
This post gives the views of the authors, and not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School
of Economics.
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